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The December 2012 agreement on EU bank supervision is a
good first step towards an effective banking union.
Blog Admin
In December 2012 European finance ministers reached an agreement that will create a
single European system of bank supervision, with the European Central Bank in charge of
directly overseeing some of Europe’s largest banks. Jacopo Carmassi, Carmine Di Noia
and Stefano Micossi welcome the agreement as a good first step towards a European
banking union and discuss a number of critical issues on which the ECOFIN compromise
has significantly improved the European Commission proposal.
In a highly integrated f inancial system, such as in the EU, taming moral hazard and
excessive risk taking requires a banking union built on three pillars: a European system of
banking supervision, European deposit insurance and a European system of  crisis
management and resolution. The three f unctions are intimately interconnected, and only
their joint management can eradicate the expectation of  national bailouts f rom the
system and thus establish proper incentives against reckless risk-taking by banks in the
internal market.
In September 2012, the European Commission tabled its proposal f or the creation of  a
single EU system of  bank supervision, on which the European Parliament and the Council
f ruitf ully worked in the ensuing months, leading f inally to a posit ive compromise within the
ECOFIN Council on December 2012. Under the agreement, a Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) will be set up comprising the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
national bank supervisors. The SSM will acquire f ull competences f or banking supervision
f or eurozone member states and other Union members willing to join, including: bank
authorisation; setting up of  extra capital and liquidity requirements; evaluation of  bank corporate
governance and internal controls; perf ormance of  stress tests; consolidated supervision; early
intervention. The agreement does not cover deposit insurance and crisis resolution but the European
Council has asked the co- legislators to come to a swif t agreement on the Commission harmonisation
proposals on these matters (published in July 2010 and June 2012), already under consideration bef ore
the European Parliament and Council, and to present, immediately af ter, a f resh proposal f or the
creation of  a European system f or bank resolution.
The agreement on banking supervision
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The agreement on banking supervision
provides a solid f irst step towards banking
union. A number of  crit ical issues had emerged
with regard to the September 2012 EU
Commission proposal, notably concerning the
scope of  application of  the SSM (euro and
non-euro EU countries), the relationship
between the ECB and national supervisory
structures, and the risk of  contamination
between monetary policy and bank supervision.
On all scores, the ECOFIN compromise has
achieved satisf actory solutions.
First, the SSM will involve all eurozone
members, but non-euro EU member states may
join the mechanism on a voluntary basis under
a ‘close cooperation’ arrangement and, if  they
did, they would have f ull voting rights in the
new ECB Supervisory Board. Non-euro member
states will retain the possibility to terminate the arrangement in case of  disagreement with specif ic
supervisory decisions, notably when these decisions are taken by the ECB Governing Council as a
modif ication of  the Supervisory Board proposal.
This is a pragmatic solution implemented as a matter of  internal ECB organisation, but it cannot eliminate
completely the dif f erent treatment of  euro and non-euro member states. It should be recalled that Article
127(6) of  TFEU is not restricted to the eurozone and may theref ore apply to all EU members. However,
Article 42(1) of  the ECB Statute states that ECB decisions are not legally binding f or non-euro member
states of  the Union. This legal obstacle could only be f ully overcome by amending the ECB Statute –
which would have required Treaty change, albeit with the simplif ied revision procedure of  Article 48(6) of
TEU. This possibility may have to be taken into consideration again at a later stage.
A second crucial aspect that has been ef f ectively handled by the ECOFIN compromise concerns the
scope of  powers of  the SSM and the allocation of  supervisory tasks between the Union level and the
national level. The new supervisory system will apply to all banks, but with dif f erent responsibilit ies f or
the direct exercise of  supervisory powers on the basis of  systemic relevance of  banks. The ECB will
dispose of  direct oversight powers f or the most signif icant banks (e.g. with total assets exceeding € 30
billion or 20 per cent of  domestic GDP) and those having requested f inancial assistance f rom the
EFSF/ESM, while national supervisors will retain direct powers on the others; the ECB will verif y the
correct application of  common supervisory powers by national authorit ies and will be allowed to
advocate powers also on less signif icant banks to ensure the consistent application of  high supervisory
standards. The European and national level will be jointly responsible, within the SSM, f or the
implementation of  the common supervisory policy and will be subject to a duty of  cooperation and an
obligation to exchange inf ormation.
This approach is an important move towards a truly f ederal system, as advocated by Carmassi, Di Noia
and Micossi: the beauty of  this system is that cases can be handled at the right level and any
unnecessary centralisation of  powers and duplication of  structures is avoided, in f ull accordance with
the principle of  subsidiarity. Such an approach will also be able to capitalise on existing national
supervisory structures and their expertise, rather than building up wholly new structures.
A third crucial issue concerns a potential conf lict between objectives: since the SSM will operate under
the responsibility of  the ECB Governing Council, it  will be of  paramount importance to avoid any
contamination between monetary policy and bank supervision. Since monetary policy objectives are
clearly enshrined in the Treaty, it is not likely that one of  the two f unctions is weakened to f avour the
other: the true risk is that disagreements between the ECB and national supervisors on interventions on
individual banks may jeopardise the independence of  the ECB Governing Council. The adopted solution
appears ef f ective: a new Supervisory Board established within the ECB and separate f rom the monetary
policy Governing Council will perf orm all supervisory tasks and will propose draf t decisions to the
Governing Council; the latter will be allowed to object in exceptional circumstances within a short t ime
limit.
A f ourth point regards the role of  the European Banking Authority (EBA), which would be in charge of
ensuring not only a single rulebook, but also unif orm supervisory practices (the “supervisory handbook”),
that are essential f or preserving the integrity of  the internal market. The agreement includes a change in
the voting mechanisms of  the EBA, with a double majority of  countries both inside and outside the SSM,
aimed at avoiding any bias in f avour of  member states participating in the SSM. The compromise ref ers
to the possibility of  EBA participation to the Supervisory Board as an observer: however, f ull and
ef f ective coordination between the EBA and the ECB would require the presence of  the EBA chairman as
a f ull voting member.
Last but not least, the new supervisory mechanism includes very signif icant powers of  early intervention
f or the ECB: the introduction of  a system of  Prompt Corrective Action, as in the US FDIC model, would
represent a crucial f urther improvement to eradicate supervisory f orbearance and prevent losses f rom
mounting while banks “gamble f or resurrection”. Such a system would entail an obligation f or supervisors
to act when bank capital f alls below certain preannounced thresholds, with increasing intensity of
remedial actions as the capital posit ion deteriorates.
Readers may also be interested in the paper, Carmassi, J., C. Di Noia and S. Micossi (2012), Banking
Union: A federal model for the European Union with prompt corrective action, CEPS Policy Brief No. 282, 18
September.
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